A synthesis of evidence for policy from behavioral science during COVID-19


Paper by Kai Ruggeri et al: “Scientific evidence regularly guides policy decisions, with behavioural science increasingly part of this process. In April 2020, an influential paper proposed 19 policy recommendations (‘claims’) detailing how evidence from behavioural science could contribute to efforts to reduce impacts and end the COVID-19 pandemic. Here we assess 747 pandemic-related research articles that empirically investigated those claims. We report the scale of evidence and whether evidence supports them to indicate applicability for policymaking. Two independent teams, involving 72 reviewers, found evidence for 18 of 19 claims, with both teams finding evidence supporting 16 (89%) of those 18 claims. The strongest evidence supported claims that anticipated culture, polarization and misinformation would be associated with policy effectiveness. Claims suggesting trusted leaders and positive social norms increased adherence to behavioural interventions also had strong empirical support, as did appealing to social consensus or bipartisan agreement. Targeted language in messaging yielded mixed effects and there were no effects for highlighting individual benefits or protecting others. No available evidence existed to assess any distinct differences in effects between using the terms ‘physical distancing’ and ‘social distancing’. Analysis of 463 papers containing data showed generally large samples; 418 involved human participants with a mean of 16,848 (median of 1,699). That statistical power underscored improved suitability of behavioural science research for informing policy decisions. Furthermore, by implementing a standardized approach to evidence selection and synthesis, we amplify broader implications for advancing scientific evidence in policy formulation and prioritization…(More)”

The Future of Community


Book by John Kraski and Justin Shenkarow: “… a groundbreaking new take on the seismic impact web3 is having—and will continue to have—on our technological and social landscapes. The authors discuss why web3 really is the “next big thing” to shape our digital and offline futures and how it will transform the world.

You’ll discover a whole host of web3 applications poised to excite and disrupt industries around the world, from fan tokens that reshape how we think about interactions between artists and fans to self-sovereign identities on the blockchain that allow you to take full control over how your personal data is used and collected online.

You’ll also find:

  • Insightful explorations of technologies and techniques like tokenization, decentralized marketplaces, decentralized autonomous organizations, and more
  • Explanations of how web3 allows you to take greater ownership and control of your digital and offline assets
  • Discussions of why web3 increases transparency and accountability at every level of business, government, and social hierarchies…(More)”.

Open Data Commons Licences (ODCL): Licensing personal and non personal data supporting the commons and privacy


Paper by Yaniv Benhamou and Melanie Dulong de Rosnay: “Data are often subject to a multitude of rights (e.g. original works or personal data posted on social media, or collected through captcha, subject to copyright, database and data protection) and voluntary shared through non standardized, non interoperable contractual terms. This leads to fragmented legal regimes and has become an even major challenge in the AI-era, for example when online platforms set their own Terms of Services (ToS), in business-to-consumer relationship (B2C).

This article proposes standard terms that may apply to all kind of data (including personal and mixed datasets subject to different legal regimes) based on the open data philosophy initially developed for Free and Open Source software and Creative Commons licenses for artistic and other copyrighted works. In a first part, we analyse how to extend open standard terms to all kinds of data (II). In a second part, we suggest to combine these open standard terms with collective governance instruments, in particular data trust, inspired by commons-based projects and by the centennial collective management of copyright (III). In a last part, after few concluding remarks (IV), we propose a template “Open Data Commons Licenses“ (ODCL) combining compulsory and optional elements to be selected by licensors, illustrated by pictograms and icons inspired by the bricks of Creative Commons licences and legal design techniques (V).

This proposal addresses the bargaining power imbalance and information asymmetry (by offering the licensor the ability to decide the terms), and conceptualises contract law differently. It reverses the current logic of contract: instead of letting companies (licensees) impose their own ToS to the users (licensors, being the copyright owner, data subject, data producer), licensors will reclaim the ability to set their own terms for access and use of data, by selecting standard terms. This should also allow the management of complex datasets, increase data sharing, and improve trust and control over the data. Like previous open licencing standards, the model is expected to lower the transaction costs by reducing the need to develop and read new complicated contractual terms. It can also spread the virality of open data to all data in an AI-era, if any input data under such terms used for AI training purposes propagates its conditions to all aggregated and output data. In other words, any data distributed under our ODCL template will turn all outcome into more or less open data and foster a data common ecosystem. Finally, instead of full openness, our model allows for restrictions outside of certain boundaries (e.g. authorized users and uses), in order to protect the commons and certain values. The model would require to be governed and monitored by a collective data trust…(More)”.

Considerations for Governing Open Foundation Models


Brief by Rishi Bommasani et al: “Foundation models (e.g., GPT-4, Llama 2) are at the epicenter of AI, driving technological innovation and billions in investment. This paradigm shift has sparked widespread demands for regulation. Animated by factors as diverse as declining transparency and unsafe labor practices, limited protections for copyright and creative work, as well as market concentration and productivity gains, many have called for policymakers to take action.

Central to the debate about how to regulate foundation models is the process by which foundation models are released. Some foundation models like Google DeepMind’s Flamingo are fully closed, meaning they are available only to the model developer; others, such as OpenAI’s GPT-4, are limited access, available to the public but only as a black box; and still others, such as Meta’s Llama 2, are more open, with widely available model weights enabling downstream modification and scrutiny. As of August 2023, the U.K.’s Competition and Markets Authority documents the most common release approach for publicly-disclosed models is open release based on data from Stanford’s Ecosystem Graphs. Developers like Meta, Stability AI, Hugging Face, Mistral, Together AI, and EleutherAI frequently release models openly.

Governments around the world are issuing policy related to foundation models. As part of these efforts, open foundation models have garnered significant attention: The recent U.S. Executive Order on Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy Artificial Intelligence tasks the National Telecommunications and Information Administration with preparing a report on open foundation models for the president. In the EU, open foundation models trained with fewer than 1025 floating point operations (a measure of the amount of compute expended) appear to be exempted under the recently negotiated AI Act. The U.K.’s AI Safety Institute will “consider open-source systems as well as those deployed with various forms of access controls” as part of its initial priorities. Beyond governments, the Partnership on AI has introduced guidelines for the safe deployment of foundation models, recommending against open release for the most capable foundation models.

Policy on foundation models should support the open foundation model ecosystem, while providing resources to monitor risks and create safeguards to address harms. Open foundation models provide significant benefits to society by promoting competition, accelerating innovation, and distributing power. For example, small businesses hoping to build generative AI applications could choose among a variety of open foundation models that offer different capabilities and are often less expensive than closed alternatives. Further, open models are marked by greater transparency and, thereby, accountability. When a model is released with its training data, independent third parties can better assess the model’s capabilities and risks…(More)”.

Populist Leaders and the Economy


Paper by Manuel Funke, Moritz Schularick and Christoph Trebesch: “Populism at the country level is at an all-time high, with more than 25 percent of nations currently governed by populists. How do economies perform under populist leaders? We build a new long-run cross-country database to study the macroeconomic history of populism. We identify 51 populist presidents and prime ministers from 1900 to 2020 and show that the economic cost of populism is high. After 15 years, GDP per capita is 10 percent lower compared to a plausible nonpopulist counterfactual. Economic disintegration, decreasing macroeconomic stability, and the erosion of institutions typically go hand in hand with populist rule…(More)”.

 Privacy-Enhancing and Privacy-Preserving Technologies: Understanding the Role of PETs and PPTs in the Digital Age


Paper by the Centre for Information Policy Leadership: “…explores how organizations are approaching privacy-enhancing technologies (“PETs”) and how PETs can advance data protection principles, and provides examples of how specific types of PETs work. It also explores potential challenges to the use of PETs and possible solutions to those challenges.

CIPL emphasizes the enormous potential inherent in these technologies to mitigate privacy risks and support innovation, and recommends a number of steps to foster further development and adoption of PETs. In particular, CIPL calls for policymakers and regulators to incentivize the use of PETs through clearer guidance on key legal concepts that impact the use of PETs, and by adopting a pragmatic approach to the application of these concepts.

CIPL’s recommendations towards wider adoption are as follows:

  • Issue regulatory guidance and incentives regarding PETs: Official regulatory guidance addressing PETs in the context of specific legal obligations or concepts (such as anonymization) will incentivize greater investment in PETs.
  • Increase education and awareness about PETs: PET developers and providers need to show tangible evidence of the value of PETs and help policymakers, regulators and organizations understand how such technologies can facilitate responsible data use.
  • Develop industry standards for PETs: Industry standards would help facilitate interoperability for the use of PETs across jurisdictions and help codify best practices to support technical reliability to foster trust in these technologies.
  • Recognize PETs as a demonstrable element of accountability: PETs complement robust data privacy management programs and should be recognized as an element of organizational accountability…(More)”.

How Moral Can A.I. Really Be?


Article by Paul Bloom: “…The problem isn’t just that people do terrible things. It’s that people do terrible things that they consider morally good. In their 2014 book “Virtuous Violence,” the anthropologist Alan Fiske and the psychologist Tage Rai argue that violence is often itself a warped expression of morality. “People are impelled to violence when they feel that to regulate certain social relationships, imposing suffering or death is necessary, natural, legitimate, desirable, condoned, admired, and ethically gratifying,” they write. Their examples include suicide bombings, honor killings, and war. The philosopher Kate Manne, in her book “Down Girl,” makes a similar point about misogynistic violence, arguing that it’s partially rooted in moralistic feelings about women’s “proper” role in society. Are we sure we want A.I.s to be guided by our idea of morality?

Schwitzgebel suspects that A.I. alignment is the wrong paradigm. “What we should want, probably, is not that superintelligent AI align with our mixed-up, messy, and sometimes crappy values but instead that superintelligent AI have ethically good values,” he writes. Perhaps an A.I. could help to teach us new values, rather than absorbing old ones. Stewart, the former graduate student, argued that if researchers treat L.L.M.s as minds and study them psychologically, future A.I. systems could help humans discover moral truths. He imagined some sort of A.I. God—a perfect combination of all the great moral minds, from Buddha to Jesus. A being that’s better than us.

Would humans ever live by values that are supposed to be superior to our own? Perhaps we’ll listen when a super-intelligent agent tells us that we’re wrong about the facts—“this plan will never work; this alternative has a better chance.” But who knows how we’ll respond if one tells us, “You think this plan is right, but it’s actually wrong.” How would you feel if your self-driving car tried to save animals by refusing to take you to a steakhouse? Would a government be happy with a military A.I. that refuses to wage wars it considers unjust? If an A.I. pushed us to prioritize the interests of others over our own, we might ignore it; if it forced us to do something that we consider plainly wrong, we would consider its morality arbitrary and cruel, to the point of being immoral. Perhaps we would accept such perverse demands from God, but we are unlikely to give this sort of deference to our own creations. We want alignment with our own values, then, not because they are the morally best ones, but because they are ours…(More)”

WikiCrow: Automating Synthesis of Human Scientific Knowledge


About: “As scientists, we stand on the shoulders of giants. Scientific progress requires curation and synthesis of prior knowledge and experimental results. However, the scientific literature is so expansive that synthesis, the comprehensive combination of ideas and results, is a bottleneck. The ability of large language models to comprehend and summarize natural language will  transform science by automating the synthesis of scientific knowledge at scale. Yet current LLMs are limited by hallucinations, lack access to the most up-to-date information, and do not provide reliable references for statements.

Here, we present WikiCrow, an automated system that can synthesize cited Wikipedia-style summaries for technical topics from the scientific literature. WikiCrow is built on top of Future House’s internal LLM agent platform, PaperQA, which in our testing, achieves state-of-the-art (SOTA) performance on a retrieval-focused version of PubMedQA and other benchmarks, including a new retrieval-first benchmark, LitQA, developed internally to evaluate systems retrieving full-text PDFs across the entire scientific literature.

As a demonstration of the potential for AI to impact scientific practice, we use WikiCrow to generate draft articles for the 15,616 human protein-coding genes that currently lack Wikipedia articles, or that have article stubs. WikiCrow creates articles in 8 minutes, is much more consistent than human editors at citing its sources, and makes incorrect inferences or statements about 9% of the time, a number that we expect to improve as we mature our systems. WikiCrow will be a foundational tool for the AI Scientists we plan to build in the coming years, and will help us to democratize access to scientific research…(More)”.

Artificial Intelligence and the City


Book edited by Federico Cugurullo, Federico Caprotti, Matthew Cook, Andrew Karvonen, Pauline McGuirk, and Simon Marvin: “This book explores in theory and practice how artificial intelligence (AI) intersects with and alters the city. Drawing upon a range of urban disciplines and case studies, the chapters reveal the multitude of repercussions that AI is having on urban society, urban infrastructure, urban governance, urban planning and urban sustainability.

Contributors also examine how the city, far from being a passive recipient of new technologies, is influencing and reframing AI through subtle processes of co-constitution. The book advances three main contributions and arguments:

  • First, it provides empirical evidence of the emergence of a post-smart trajectory for cities in which new material and decision-making capabilities are being assembled through multiple AIs.
  • Second, it stresses the importance of understanding the mutually constitutive relations between the new experiences enabled by AI technology and the urban context.
  • Third, it engages with the concepts required to clarify the opaque relations that exist between AI and the city, as well as how to make sense of these relations from a theoretical perspective…(More)”.

Steering Responsible AI: A Case for Algorithmic Pluralism


Paper by Stefaan G. Verhulst: “In this paper, I examine questions surrounding AI neutrality through the prism of existing literature and scholarship about mediation and media pluralism. Such traditions, I argue, provide a valuable theoretical framework for how we should approach the (likely) impending era of AI mediation. In particular, I suggest examining further the notion of algorithmic pluralism. Contrasting this notion to the dominant idea of algorithmic transparency, I seek to describe what algorithmic pluralism may be, and present both its opportunities and challenges. Implemented thoughtfully and responsibly, I argue, Algorithmic or AI pluralism has the potential to sustain the diversity, multiplicity, and inclusiveness that are so vital to democracy…(More)”.