The effects of ICT use and ICT Laws on corruption: A general deterrence theory perspective


Anol Bhattacherjee and Utkarsh Shrivastava in Government Information Quarterly: “Investigations of white collar crimes such as corruption are often hindered by the lack of information or physical evidence. Information and communication technologies (ICT), by virtue of their ability to monitor, track, record, analyze, and share vast amounts of information may help countries identify and prosecute criminals, and deter future corruption. While prior studies have demonstrated that ICT is an important tool in reducing corruption at the country level, they provide little explanation as to how ICT influences corruption and when does it work best.

We explore these gaps in the literature using the hypothetico-deductive approach to research, by using general deterrence theory to postulate a series of main and moderating effects relating ICT use and corruption, and then testing those effects using secondary data analysis. Our analysis suggests that ICT use influences corruption by increasing the certainty and celerity of punishment related to corruption. Moreover, ICT laws moderate the effect of ICT use on corruption, suggesting that ICT investments may have limited effect on corruption, unless complemented with appropriate ICT laws. Implications of our findings for research and practice are discussed….(More)”.

Behavioural science and policy: where are we now and where are we going?


Michael Sanders et al in Behavioral Public Policy: “The use of behavioural sciences in government has expanded and matured in the last decade. Since the Behavioural Insights Team (BIT) has been part of this movement, we sketch out the history of the team and the current state of behavioural public policy, recognising that other works have already told this story in detail. We then set out two clusters of issues that have emerged from our work at BIT. The first cluster concerns current challenges facing behavioural public policy: the long-term effects of interventions; repeated exposure effects; problems with proxy measures; spillovers and general equilibrium effects and unintended consequences; cultural variation; ‘reverse impact’; and the replication crisis. The second cluster concerns opportunities: influencing the behaviour of government itself; scaling interventions; social diffusion; nudging organisations; and dealing with thorny problems. We conclude that the field will need to address these challenges and take these opportunities in order to realise the full potential of behavioural public policy….(More)”.

Odd Numbers: Algorithms alone can’t meaningfully hold other algorithms accountable


Frank Pasquale at Real Life Magazine: “Algorithms increasingly govern our social world, transforming data into scores or rankings that decide who gets credit, jobs, dates, policing, and much more. The field of “algorithmic accountability” has arisen to highlight the problems with such methods of classifying people, and it has great promise: Cutting-edge work in critical algorithm studies applies social theory to current events; law and policy experts seem to publish new articles daily on how artificial intelligence shapes our lives, and a growing community of researchers has developed a field known as “Fairness, Accuracy, and Transparency in Machine Learning.”

The social scientists, attorneys, and computer scientists promoting algorithmic accountability aspire to advance knowledge and promote justice. But what should such “accountability” more specifically consist of? Who will define it? At a two-day, interdisciplinary roundtable on AI ethics I recently attended, such questions featured prominently, and humanists, policy experts, and lawyers engaged in a free-wheeling discussion about topics ranging from robot arms races to computationally planned economies. But at the end of the event, an emissary from a group funded by Elon Musk and Peter Thiel among others pronounced our work useless. “You have no common methodology,” he informed us (apparently unaware that that’s the point of an interdisciplinary meeting). “We have a great deal of money to fund real research on AI ethics and policy”— which he thought of as dry, economistic modeling of competition and cooperation via technology — “but this is not the right group.” He then gratuitously lashed out at academics in attendance as “rent seekers,” largely because we had the temerity to advance distinctive disciplinary perspectives rather than fall in line with his research agenda.

Most corporate contacts and philanthrocapitalists are more polite, but their sense of what is realistic and what is utopian, what is worth studying and what is mere ideology, is strongly shaping algorithmic accountability research in both social science and computer science. This influence in the realm of ideas has powerful effects beyond it. Energy that could be put into better public transit systems is instead diverted to perfect the coding of self-driving cars. Anti-surveillance activism transmogrifies into proposals to improve facial recognition systems to better recognize all faces. To help payday-loan seekers, developers might design data-segmentation protocols to show them what personal information they should reveal to get a lower interest rate. But the idea that such self-monitoring and data curation can be a trap, disciplining the user in ever finer-grained ways, remains less explored. Trying to make these games fairer, the research elides the possibility of rejecting them altogether….(More)”.

World War Web


Special issue of Foreign Affairs: “The last few decades have witnessed the growth of an American-sponsored Internet open to all. But that was then; conditions have changed.

History is filled with supposed lost utopias, and there is no greater cliché than to see one’s own era as a lamentable decline from a previous golden age. Sometimes, however, clichés are right. And as we explored the Internet’s future for this issue’s lead package, it became clear this was one of those times. Contemplating where we have come from digitally and where we are heading, it’s hard not to feel increasingly wistful and nostalgic.

The last few decades have witnessed the growth of an American-sponsored Internet open to all, and that has helped tie the world together, bringing wide-ranging benefits to billions. But that was then; conditions have changed.

Other great powers are contesting U.S. digital leadership, pushing their own national priorities. Security threats appear and evolve constantly. Platforms that were supposed to expand and enrich the marketplace of ideas have been hijacked by trolls and bots and flooded with disinformation. And real power is increasingly concentrated in the hands of a few private tech giants, whose self-interested choices have dramatic consequences for the entire world around them.

Whatever emerges from this melee, it will be different from, and in many ways worse than, what we have now.

Adam Segal paints the big picture well. “The Internet has long been an American project,” he writes. “Yet today, the United States has ceded leadership in cyberspace to China.” What will happen if Beijing continues its online ascent? “The Internet will be less global and less open. A major part of it will run Chinese applications over Chinese-made hardware. And Beijing will reap the economic, diplomatic, national security, and intelligence benefits that once flowed to Washington.”

Nandan Nilekani, a co-founder of Infosys, outlines India’s unique approach to these issues, which is based on treating “digital infrastructure as a public good and data as something that citizens deserve access to.” Helen Dixon, Ireland’s data protection commissioner, presents a European perspective, arguing that giving individuals control over their own data—as the General Data Protection Regulation, the EU’s historic new regulatory effort, aims to do—is essential to restoring the Internet’s promise. And Karen Kornbluh, a veteran U.S. policymaker, describes how the United States dropped the digital ball and what it could do to pick it up again.

Finally, Michèle Flournoy and Michael Sulmeyer explain the new realities of cyberwarfare, and Viktor Mayer-Schönberger and Thomas Ramge consider the problems caused by Big Tech’s hoarding of data and what can be done to address it.

A generation from now, people across the globe will no doubt revel in the benefits the Internet has brought. But the more thoughtful among them will also lament the eclipse of the founders’ idealistic vision and dream of a world connected the way it could—and should— have been….(More)”.

The Risks of Dangerous Dashboards in Basic Education


Lant Pritchett at the Center for Global Development: “On June 1, 2009 Air France flight 447 from Rio de Janeiro to Paris crashed into the Atlantic Ocean killing all 228 people on board. While the Airbus 330 was flying on auto-pilot, the different speed indicators received by the on-board navigation computers started to give conflicting speeds, almost certainly because the pitot tubes responsible for measuring air speed had iced over. Since the auto-pilot could not resolve conflicting signals and hence did not know how fast the plane was actually going, it turned control of the plane over to the two first officers (the captain was out of the cockpit). Subsequent flight simulator trials replicating the conditions of the flight conclude that had the pilots done nothing at all everyone would have lived—nothing was actually wrong; only the indicators were faulty, not the actual speed. But, tragically, the pilots didn’t do nothing….

What is the connection to education?

Many countries’ systems of basic education are in “stall” condition.

A recent paper of Beatty et al. (2018) uses information from the Indonesia Family Life Survey, a representative household survey that has been carried out in several waves with the same individuals since 2000 and contains information on whether individuals can answer simple arithmetic questions. Figure 1, showing the relationship between the level of schooling and the probability of answering a typical question correctly, has two shocking results.

First, the difference in the likelihood a person can answer a simple mathematics question correctly differs by only 20 percent between individuals who have completed less than primary school (<PS)—who can answer correctly (adjusted for guessing) about 20 percent of the time—and those who have completed senior secondary school or more (>=SSS), who answer correctly only about 40 percent of the time. These are simple multiple choice questions like whether 56/84 is the same fraction as (can be reduced to) 2/3, and whether 1/3-1/6 equals 1/6. This means that in an entire year of schooling, less than 2 additional children per 100 gain the ability to answer simple arithmetic questions.

Second, this incredibly poor performance in 2000 got worse by 2014. …

What has this got to do with education dashboards? The way large bureaucracies prefer to work is to specify process compliance and inputs and then measure those as a means of driving performance. This logistical mode of managing an organization works best when both process compliance and inputs are easily “observable” in the economist’s sense of easily verifiable, contractible, adjudicated. This leads to attention to processes and inputs that are “thin” in the Clifford Geertz sense (adopted by James Scott as his primary definition of how a “high modern” bureaucracy and hence the state “sees” the world). So in education one would specify easily-observable inputs like textbook availability, class size, school infrastructure. Even if one were talking about “quality” of schooling, a large bureaucracy would want this too reduced to “thin” indicators, like the fraction of teachers with a given type of formal degree, or process compliance measures, like whether teachers were hired based on some formal assessment.

Those involved in schooling can then become obsessed with their dashboards and the “thin” progress that is being tracked and easily ignore the loud warning signals saying: Stall!…(More)”.

As democracy goes digital, those offline are being pushed out of politics


Renata Avila at the Web Foundation: “Free and fair elections require an informed, active body of citizens debating the electoral issues of the day and scrutinising the positions of candidates. Participation at each and every stage of an electoral campaign — not just on the day of the vote — is necessary for a healthy democracy.

Those online have access to an increasingly sophisticated set of tools to do just this: to learn about candidates, to participate in political discussions, to shape debate and raise issues that matter to them. Or even, run for office themselves.

What does this mean for those citizens who don’t have access to the internet? Do online debates capture their needs, concerns and interests? Are the priorities of those not connected represented on the political stage?

The Mexican election: a story of digital inequality

María de Jesús “Marichuy” Patricio Martinez was selected as an independent candidate in Mexico’s recent July 1 elections general election — the first indigenous woman to run for president. But digital barriers doomed her candidacy.

Independent presidential candidates in Mexico are required to collect 866,000 signatures using a mandatory mobile app that only runs on relatively new smartphones. This means that to collect the required endorsements, a candidate and their supporters all need a modern smartphone — which typically costs around three times the minimum monthly salary — plus electricity and mobile data. These are resources many people in indigenous communities simply don’t have. While the electoral authorities exempted some municipalities from this process, it did not cover the mostly poor and indigenous areas that Marichuy wanted to represent. She was unable to gather the signatures needed….(More)”.

Searching for the Smart City’s Democratic Future


Article by Bianca Wylie at the Center for International Governance Innovation: “There is a striking blue building on Toronto’s eastern waterfront. Wrapped top to bottom in bright, beautiful artwork by Montreal illustrator Cecile Gariepy, the building — a former fish-processing plant — stands out alongside the neighbouring parking lots and a congested highway. It’s been given a second life as an office for Sidewalk Labs — a sister company to Google that is proposing a smart city development in Toronto. Perhaps ironically, the office is like the smart city itself: something old repackaged to be light, fresh and novel.

“Our mission is really to use technology to redefine urban life in the twenty-first century.”

Dan Doctoroff, CEO of Sidewalk Labs, shared this mission in an interview with Freakonomics Radio. The phrase is a variant of the marketing language used by the smart city industry at large. Put more simply, the term “smart city” is usually used to describe the use of technology and data in cities.

No matter the words chosen to describe it, the smart city model has a flaw at its core: corporations are seeking to exert influence on urban spaces and democratic governance. And because most governments don’t have the policy in place to regulate smart city development — in particular, projects driven by the fast-paced technology sector — this presents a growing global governance concern.

This is where the story usually descends into warnings of smart city dystopia or failure. Loads of recent articles have detailed the science fiction-style city-of-the-future and speculated about the perils of mass data collection, and for good reason — these are important concepts that warrant discussion. It’s time, however, to push past dystopian narratives and explore solutions for the challenges that smart cities present in Toronto and globally…(More)”.

Data-Driven Law: Data Analytics and the New Legal Services


Book by Edward J. Walters: “For increasingly data-savvy clients, lawyers can no longer give “it depends” answers rooted in anecdata. Clients insist that their lawyers justify their reasoning, and with more than a limited set of war stories. The considered judgment of an experienced lawyer is unquestionably valuable. However, on balance, clients would rather have the considered judgment of an experienced lawyer informed by the most relevant information required to answer their questions.

Data-Driven Law: Data Analytics and the New Legal Services helps legal professionals meet the challenges posed by a data-driven approach to delivering legal services. Its chapters are written by leading experts who cover such topics as:

  • Mining legal data
  • Computational law
  • Uncovering bias through the use of Big Data
  • Quantifying the quality of legal services
  • Data mining and decision-making
  • Contract analytics and contract standards

In addition to providing clients with data-based insight, legal firms can track a matter with data from beginning to end, from the marketing spend through to the type of matter, hours spent, billed, and collected, including metrics on profitability and success. Firms can organize and collect documents after a matter and even automate them for reuse. Data on marketing related to a matter can be an amazing source of insight about which practice areas are most profitable….(More)”.

Data Publics: Urban Protest, Analytics and the Courts


Article by Anthony McCosker and Timothy Graham in MC Journal: “There are many examples globally of the use of social media to engage publics in battles over urban development or similar issues (e.g. Fredericks and Foth). Some have asked how social media might be better used by neighborhood organisations to mobilise protest and save historic buildings, cultural landmarks or urban sites (Johnson and Halegoua). And we can only note here the wealth of research literature on social movements, protest and social media. To emphasise Gerbaudo’s point, drawing on Mattoni, we “need to account for how exactly the use of these media reshapes the ‘repertoire of communication’ of contemporary movements and affects the experience of participants” (2). For us, this also means better understanding the role that social data plays in both aiding and reshaping urban protest or arming third sector groups with evidence useful in social institutions such as the courts.

New modes of digital engagement enable forms of distributed digital citizenship, which Meikle sees as the creative political relationships that form through exercising rights and responsibilities. Associated with these practices is the transition from sanctioned, simple discursive forms of social protest in petitions, to new indicators of social engagement in more nuanced social media data and the more interactive forms of online petition platforms like change.org or GetUp (Halpin et al.). These technical forms code publics in specific ways that have implications for contemporary protest action. That is, they provide the operational systems and instructions that shape social actions and relationships for protest purposes (McCosker and Milne).

All protest and social movements are underwritten by explicit or implicit concepts of participatory publics as these are shaped, enhanced, or threatened by communication technologies. But participatory protest publics are uneven, and as Kelty asks: “What about all the people who are neither protesters nor Twitter users? In the broadest possible sense this ‘General Public’ cannot be said to exist as an actual entity, but only as a kind of virtual entity” (27). Kelty is pointing to the porous boundary between a general public and an organised public, or formal enterprise, as a reminder that we cannot take for granted representations of a public, or the public as a given, in relation to Like or follower data for instance.

If carefully gauged, the concept of data publics can be useful. To start with, the notions of publics and publicness are notoriously slippery. Baym and boyd explore the differences between these two terms, and the way social media reconfigures what “public” is. Does a Comment or a Like on a Facebook Page connect an individual sufficiently to an issues-public? As far back as the 1930s, John Dewey was seeking a pragmatic approach to similar questions regarding human association and the pluralistic space of “the public”. For Dewey, “the machine age has so enormously expanded, multiplied, intensified and complicated the scope of the indirect consequences [of human association] that the resultant public cannot identify itself” (157). To what extent, then, can we use data to constitute a public in relation to social protest in the age of data analytics?

There are numerous well formulated approaches to studying publics in relation to social media and social networks. Social network analysis (SNA) determines publics, or communities, through links, ties and clustering, by measuring and mapping those connections and to an extent assuming that they constitute some form of sociality. Networked publics (Ito, 6) are understood as an outcome of social media platforms and practices in the use of new digital media authoring and distribution tools or platforms and the particular actions, relationships or modes of communication they afford, to use James Gibson’s sense of that term. “Publics can be reactors, (re)makers and (re)distributors, engaging in shared culture and knowledge through discourse and social exchange as well as through acts of media reception” (Ito 6). Hashtags, for example, facilitate connectivity and visibility and aid in the formation and “coordination of ad hoc issue publics” (Bruns and Burgess 3). Gray et al., following Ruppert, argue that “data publics are constituted by dynamic, heterogeneous arrangements of actors mobilised around data infrastructures, sometimes figuring as part of them, sometimes emerging as their effect”. The individuals of data publics are neither subjugated by the logics and metrics of digital platforms and data structures, nor simply sovereign agents empowered by the expressive potential of aggregated data (Gray et al.).

Data publics are more than just aggregates of individual data points or connections. They are inherently unstable, dynamic (despite static analysis and visualisations), or vibrant, and ephemeral. We emphasise three key elements of active data publics. First, to be more than an aggregate of individual items, a data public needs to be consequential (in Dewey’s sense of issues or problem-oriented). Second, sufficient connection is visible over time. Third, affective or emotional activity is apparent in relation to events that lend coherence to the public and its prevailing sentiment. To these, we add critical attention to the affordising processes – or the deliberate and incidental effects of datafication and analysis, in the capacities for data collection and processing in order to produce particular analytical outcomes, and the data literacies these require. We return to the latter after elaborating on the Save the Palace case….(More)”.

Countries Can Learn from France’s Plan for Public Interest Data and AI


Nick Wallace at the Center for Data Innovation: “French President Emmanuel Macron recently endorsed a national AI strategy that includes plans for the French state to make public and private sector datasets available for reuse by others in applications of artificial intelligence (AI) that serve the public interest, such as for healthcare or environmental protection. Although this strategy fails to set out how the French government should promote widespread use of AI throughout the economy, it will nevertheless give a boost to AI in some areas, particularly public services. Furthermore, the plan for promoting the wider reuse of datasets, particularly in areas where the government already calls most of the shots, is a practical idea that other countries should consider as they develop their own comprehensive AI strategies.

The French strategy, drafted by mathematician and Member of Parliament Cédric Villani, calls for legislation to mandate repurposing both public and private sector data, including personal data, to enable public-interest uses of AI by government or others, depending on the sensitivity of the data. For example, public health services could use data generated by Internet of Things (IoT) devices to help doctors better treat and diagnose patients. Researchers could use data captured by motorway CCTV to train driverless cars. Energy distributors could manage peaks and troughs in demand using data from smart meters.

Repurposed data held by private companies could be made publicly available, shared with other companies, or processed securely by the public sector, depending on the extent to which sharing the data presents privacy risks or undermines competition. The report suggests that the government would not require companies to share data publicly when doing so would impact legitimate business interests, nor would it require that any personal data be made public. Instead, Dr. Villani argues that, if wider data sharing would do unreasonable damage to a company’s commercial interests, it may be appropriate to only give public authorities access to the data. But where the stakes are lower, companies could be required to share the data more widely, to maximize reuse. Villani rightly argues that it is virtually impossible to come up with generalizable rules for how data should be shared that would work across all sectors. Instead, he argues for a sector-specific approach to determining how and when data should be shared.

After making the case for state-mandated repurposing of data, the report goes on to highlight four key sectors as priorities: health, transport, the environment, and defense. Since these all have clear implications for the public interest, France can create national laws authorizing extensive repurposing of personal data without violating the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) which allows national laws that permit the repurposing of personal data where it serves the public interest. The French strategy is the first clear effort by an EU member state to proactively use this clause in aid of national efforts to bolster AI….(More)”.