Insights On Collective Problem-Solving: Complexity, Categorization And Lessons From Academia


Part 3 of an interview series by Henry Farrell for the MacArthur Research Network on Opening Governance: “…Complexity theorists have devoted enormous energy and attention to thinking about how complex problems, in which different factors interact in ways that are hard to predict, can best be solved. One key challenge is categorizing problems, so as to understand which approaches are best suited to addressing them.

Scott Page is the Leonid Hurwicz Collegiate Professor of Complex Systems at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, and one of the world’s foremost experts on diversity and problem-solving. I asked him a series of questions about how we might use insights from academic research to think better about how problem solving works.

Henry: One of the key issues of collective problem-solving is what you call the ‘problem of problems’ – the question of identifying which problems we need to solve. This is often politically controversial – e.g., it may be hard to get agreement that global warming, or inequality, or long prison sentences are a problem. How do we best go about identifying problems, given that people may disagree?

Scott: In a recent big think paper on the potential of diversity for collective problem solving in Scientific American, Katherine Phillips writes that group members must feel validated, that they must share a commitment to the group, and they must have a common goal if they are going to contribute. This implies that you won’t succeed in getting people to collaborate by setting an agenda from on high and then seeking to attract diverse people to further that agenda.

One way of starting to tackle the problem of problems is to steal a rule of thumb from Getting to Yes, by getting to think people about their broad interests rather than the position that they’re starting from. People often agree on their fundamental desires but disagree on how they can be achieved. For example, nearly everyone wants less crime, but they may disagree over whether they think the solution to crime involves tackling poverty or imposing longer prison sentences. If you can get them to focus on their common interest in solving crime rather than their disagreements, you’re more likely to get them to collaborate usefully.

Segregation amplifies the problem of problems. We live in towns and neighborhoods segregated by race, income, ideology, and human capital. Democrats live near Democrats and Republicans near Republicans. Consensus requires integration. We must work across ideologies. Relatedly, opportunity requires more than access. Many people grow up not knowing any engineers, dentists, doctors, lawyers, and statisticians. This isolation narrows the set of careers they consider and it reduces the diversity of many professions. We cannot imagine lives we do not know.

Henry: Once you get past the problem of problems, you still need to identify which kind of problem you are dealing with. You identify three standard types of problems: solution problems, selection problems and optimization problems. What – very briefly – are the key differences between these kinds of problems?

Scott: I’m constantly pondering the potential set of categories in which collective intelligence can emerge. I’m teaching a course on collective intelligence this semester and the undergraduates and I developed an acronym SCARCE PIGS to describe the different types of domains. Here’s the brief summary:

  • Predict: when individuals combine information, models, or measurements to estimate a future event, guess an answer, or classify an event. Examples might involve betting markets, or combined efforts to guess a quantity, such as Francis Galton’s example of people at a fair trying to guess the weight of a steer.
  • Identify: when individuals have local, partial, or possibly erroneous knowledge and collectively can find an object. Here, an example is DARPA’s Red Balloon project.
  • Solve: when individuals apply and possibly combine higher order cognitive processes and analytic tools for the purpose of finding or improving a solution to a task. Innocentive and similar organizations provide examples of this.
  • Generate: when individuals apply diverse representations, heuristics, and knowledge to produce something new. An everyday example is creating a new building.
  • Coordinate: when individuals adopt similar actions, behaviors, beliefs, or mental frameworks by learning through local interactions. Ordinary social conventions such as people greeting each other are good examples.
  • Cooperate: when individuals take actions, not necessarily in their self interest, that collectively produce a desirable outcome. Here, think of managing common pool resources (e.g. fishing boats not overfishing an area that they collectively control).
  • Arrange: when individuals manipulate items in a physical or virtual environment for their own purposes resulting in an organization of that environment. As an example, imagine a student co-op which keeps twenty types of hot sauce in its pantry. If each student puts whichever hot sauce she uses in the front of the pantry, then on average, the hot sauces will be arranged according to popularity, with the most favored hot sauces in the front and the least favored lost in the back.
  • Respond: when individuals react to external or internal stimuli creating collective responses that maintains system level functioning. For example, when yellow jackets attack a predator to maintain the colony, they are displaying this kind of problem solving.
  • Emerge: when individual parts create a whole that has categorically distinct and new functionalities. The most obvious example of this is the human brain….(More)”

Is behavioural economics ready to save the world?


Book review by Trenton G Smith of Behavioral Economics and Public Health : “Modern medicine has long doled out helpful advice to ailing patients about not only drug treatments, but also diet, exercise, alcohol abuse, and many other lifestyle decisions. And for just as long, patients have been failing to follow doctors’ orders. Many of today’s most pressing public health problems would disappear if people would just make better choices.

Enter behavioural economics. A fairly recent offshoot of the dismal science, behavioural economics aims to take the coldly rational decision makers who normally populate economic theories, and instil in them a host of human foibles. Neoclassical (ie, conventional) economics, after all is the study of optimising behaviour in the presence of material constraints—why not add constraints on cognitive capacity, or self-control, or susceptibility to the formation of bad habits? The hope is that by incorporating insights from other behavioural sciences (most notably cognitive psychology and neuroscience) while retaining the methodological rigour of neoclassical economics, behavioural economics will yield a more richly descriptive theory of human behaviour, and generate new and important insights to better inform public policy.

Policy makers have taken notice. In an era in which free-market rhetoric dominates the political landscape, the idea that small changes to public health policies might serve to nudge consumers towards healthier behaviours holds great appeal. Even though some (irrational) consumers might be better off, the argument goes, if certain unhealthy food products were banned (or worse, taxed), this approach would infringe on the rights of the many consumers who want to indulge occasionally, and fully understand the consequences. If governments could instead use evidence from consumer science to make food labels more effective, or to improve the way that healthy foods are presented in school cafeterias, more politically unpalatable interventions in the marketplace might not be needed. This idea, dubbed “libertarian paternalism” by Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein, has been pursued with gusto in both the UK (David Cameron’s Government formed the Behavioural Insights Team—unofficially described as the Nudge Unit) and the USA (where Sunstein spent time in the Obama administration’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs).

Whatever public health practitioners might think about these developments—or indeed, of economics as a discipline—this turn of events has rather suddenly given scholars at the cutting edge of consumer science an influential voice in the regulatory process, and some of the best and brightest have stepped up to contribute. Behavioral Economics & Public Health (edited by Christina Roberto and Ichiro Kawachi) is the product of a 2014 Harvard University exploratory workshop on applying social science insights to public health. As might be expected in a volume that aims to bring together two such inherently multidisciplinary fields, the book’s 11 chapters offer an eclectic mix of perspectives. The editors begin with an excellent overview of the field of behavioural economics and its applications to public health, and an economic perspective can also be found in four of the other chapters: Justin White and William Dow write about intertemporal choice, Kristina Lewis and Jason Block review the use of incentives to promote health, Michael Sanders and Michael Hallsworth describe their experience working within the UK’s Behavioural Insights Team, and Frederick Zimmerman concludes with a thoughtful critique of the field of behavioural economics. The other contributions are largely from the perspectives of psychology and marketing: Dennis Runger and Wendy Wood discuss habit formation, Rebecca Ferrer and colleagues emphasise the importance of emotion in decision making, Brent McFerran discusses social norms in the context of obesity, Jason Riis and Rebecca Ratner explain why some public health communication strategies are more effective than others, and Zoe Chance and colleagues and Brian Wansink offer frameworks for designing environments (eg, in schools and workplaces) that are conducive to healthy choices.

This collection of essays holds many hidden gems, but the one that surprised me the most was the attention given (by Runger and Wood briefly, and Zimmerman extensively) to a dirty little secret that behavioural economists rarely mention: once it is acknowledged that sometimes-irrational consumers can be manipulated into making healthy choices, it does not require much of a leap to conclude that business interests can—and do—use the same methods to push back in the other direction. This conclusion leads Zimmerman to a discussion of power in the marketplace and in our collective political economy, and to a call to action on these larger structural issues in society that neoclassical theory has long neglected….(More; Book)

Army looks to outsmart soldiers’ bad habits


 at the Army Times: “You wouldn’t think that moving the salad bar to the front of the chow hall and moving the dessert bar back 10 feet would make the Army healthier. But at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, that bumped up salad sales about 24 percent and dessert sales down 10 percent, a nudge toward goals of soldiers eating, exercising and sleeping healthier.

That’s just an example of the kind of change Army Medical Command hopes to inspire and successes it hopes to share across installations through its first annual Health of the Force report.

“I’m pretty proud of what we’ve been able to accomplish with this inaugural report,” said Col. Deydre Teyhen during a recent roundtable at Defense Health Agency headquarters in Falls Church, Virginia.  “I think we can’t get to a better state of health unless we inform people of what’s working out there in the field.”

The Army hopes to reduce the figure of 17 percent of soldiers not medically deployable within 72 hours. …The overarching philosophy of these recent MEDCOM efforts is to improve overall health rather than play whack-a-mole with problems as they arise. Teyhen pointed out that the average soldier is a patient at a health care facility for about 100 minutes per year, and the trick is to influence soldier health choices over the other 525,500 minutes, extending influence outside of brick-and-mortar health facilities.It dovetails with the Army’s Performance Triad, the plan to improve readiness through sleep, nutrition and exercise….(More)”

Calling Dunbar’s Numbers


Pádraig MacCarron, Kimmo Kaski, and Robin Dunbar at arXiv: “The social brain hypothesis predicts that humans have an average of about 150 relationships at any given time. Within this 150, there are layers of friends of an ego, where the number of friends in a layer increases as the emotional closeness decreases. Here we analyse a mobile phone dataset, firstly, to ascertain whether layers of friends can be identified based on call frequency. We then apply different clustering algorithms to break the call frequency of egos into clusters and compare the number of alters in each cluster with the layer size predicted by the social brain hypothesis. In this dataset we find strong evidence for the existence of a layered structure. The clustering yields results that match well with previous studies for the innermost and outermost layers, but for layers in between we observe large variability….(More)”

NEW Platform for Sharing Research on Opening Governance: The Open Governance Research Exchange (OGRX)


Andrew Young: “Today,  The GovLab, in collaboration with founding partners mySociety and the World Bank’s Digital Engagement Evaluation Team are launching the Open Governance Research Exchange (OGRX), a new platform for sharing research and findings on innovations in governance.

From crowdsourcing to nudges to open data to participatory budgeting, more open and innovative ways to tackle society’s problems and make public institutions more effective are emerging. Yet little is known about what innovations actually work, when, why, for whom and under what conditions.

And anyone seeking existing research is confronted with sources that are widely dispersed across disciplines, often locked behind pay walls, and hard to search because of the absence of established taxonomies. As the demand to confront problems in new ways grows so too does the urgency for making learning about governance innovations more accessible.

As part of GovLab’s broader effort to move from “faith-based interventions” toward more “evidence-based interventions,” OGRX curates and makes accessible the most diverse and up-to-date collection of findings on innovating governance. At launch, the site features over 350 publications spanning a diversity of governance innovation areas, including but not limited to:

Visit ogrx.org to explore the latest research findings, submit your own work for inclusion on the platform, and share knowledge with others interested in using science and technology to improve the way we govern. (More)”

The Evolution of Wikipedia’s Norm Network


Bradi Heaberlin and Simon DeDeo at Future Internet: “Social norms have traditionally been difficult to quantify. In any particular society, their sheer number and complex interdependencies often limit a system-level analysis. One exception is that of the network of norms that sustain the online Wikipedia community. We study the fifteen-year evolution of this network using the interconnected set of pages that establish, describe, and interpret the community’s norms. Despite Wikipedia’s reputation for ad hocgovernance, we find that its normative evolution is highly conservative. The earliest users create norms that both dominate the network and persist over time. These core norms govern both content and interpersonal interactions using abstract principles such as neutrality, verifiability, and assume good faith. As the network grows, norm neighborhoods decouple topologically from each other, while increasing in semantic coherence. Taken together, these results suggest that the evolution of Wikipedia’s norm network is akin to bureaucratic systems that predate the information age….(More)”

Applying Behavioral Economics to Public Health Policy


Jennifer L. Matjasko, et al in the American Journal of Preventive Medicine: “From the beginning, health has been recognized as a fertile area for applying nudges. The subtitle of the bookNudge is Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness. In their discussion of health behaviors, Thaler and Sunstein propose new nudges in health, such as simplifying decision making in Medicare. In fact, section 1511 of the Affordable Care Act requires large employers to automatically enroll workers into health insurance; similar to the previous example on organ donation, this switched from an opt-in to an opt-out system in order to harness the power of defaults. We will provide examples in which concepts from behavioral economics were applied to public health policy and led to improvements in health attitudes and behaviors. A summary of these applications is provided in Table 1.

Nudges can be effective because people are influenced by stimuli that are visible and new; thus, at least in theory, small changes can lead to behavior modification. Several studies have found that simply prompting (nudging) individuals to make a plan increases the probability of the subject eventually engaging in the prompted health behavior, such as immunizations, healthy eating, and cancer screening. For example, one study found that e-mailing patients appointment times and locations for their next influenza vaccination increased vaccination rates by 36%. Another intervention was even simpler. Rather than assigning a date and time for the patient to be vaccinated, patients were simply mailed a card that asked the patient to write down the day or day and time they planned to get the influenza vaccine (they were also sent the day and time of the free influenza vaccine clinics). Relative to a control condition (people who only received the information about the day and time of the clinics), those prompted to write down the day and time they planned to get the influenza vaccine were 4.2 percentage points (12.7%) more likely to receive the vaccine at those clinics. Those prompted to write down the date but not the time were not significantly more likely to be vaccinated at the clinics. Decision heuristics, such as highlighting consensus, may also help. Highlighting descriptive norms among a group of trusted experts, or priming (e.g., that 90% of doctors agree that vaccines are safe) can significantly reduce public concern about (childhood) vaccines and promote intentions to vaccinate.

The significant influence of framing has been demonstrated in many public health domains, such as messaging about blood transfusion,  smoking cessation, sunscreen use, and mammography utilization. In particular, gains-framed messages (i.e., emphasizing the health gains of a behavior or treatment) were more likely to have a positive impact on the attitudes toward activities targeting prevention (e.g., blood safety, sunscreen use, smoking cessation). Loss-based messages may be more effective at encouraging screening behaviors, such as mammography screening. This points to the importance of testing messages for the uptake of preventive services among varying subgroups, many of which are now covered without cost-sharing as a result of the coverage of preventive services mandated in the Affordable Care Act.

Detailed Illustrative Examples (More)”

What works?


Dan Davies at TheLong & Short: “Evidence-based policy is very much in fashion at the moment in all departments of government. Of course it’s a good idea; the main argument for it is summarised admirably by the name. But people who expect big things from evidence-based approaches ought to be really quite worried right now.

Because the methodology used in a lot of evidence-based policy analysis is very similar to that used in experimental psychology. And at the moment, psychology is a subject with some very serious methodological problems.

It’s being called the ‘reproducibility crisis’ and in summary, the problem is that large-scale and careful attempts to replicate some of the best-established and most important results of the last few decades are not finding the effects they were meant to find. This is even happening for effects like ‘ego depletion’ (the idea that resisting temptation requires effort and makes it harder to exercise willpower), which are the subject of dozens or even hundreds of research papers.

There appear to be two related problems. First, there is a knot of issues relating to methodology and the interpretation of statistical tests, which means that there is a systematic tendency to find too many statistically significant results. And second, it turns out that a lot of psychology results are just ‘fragile’ – they describe much smaller sets of individuals than hoped, and are very dependent on particular situations, rather than reflecting broad truths about humanity.

Both of these problems are likely to be shared by a lot of other areas. For example, the methodology of behavioural economics has a very big overlap with experimental psychology, and is likely to have many of the same reproducibility issues. So lots of ‘nudge’ schemes related to savings and pensions could be based on fragile results….(More)”

Innovation Prizes in Practice and Theory


Paper by Michael J. Burstein and Fiona Murray: “Innovation prizes in reality are significantly different from innovation prizes in theory. The former are familiar from popular accounts of historical prizes like the Longitude Prize: the government offers a set amount for a solution to a known problem, like £20,000 for a method of calculating longitude at sea. The latter are modeled as compensation to inventors in return for donating their inventions to the public domain. Neither the economic literature nor the policy literature that led to the 2010 America COMPETES Reauthorization Act — which made prizes a prominent tool of government innovation policy — provides a satisfying justification for the use of prizes, nor does either literature address their operation. In this article, we address both of these problems. We use a case study of one canonical, high profile innovation prize — the Progressive Insurance Automotive X Prize — to explain how prizes function as institutional means to achieve exogenously defined innovation policy goals in the face of significant uncertainty and information asymmetries. Focusing on the structure and function of actual innovation prizes as an empirical matter enables us to make three theoretical contributions to the current understanding of prizes. First, we offer a stronger normative justification for prizes grounded in their status as a key institutional arrangement for solving a specified innovation problem. Second, we develop a model of innovation prize governance and then situate that model in the administrative state, as a species of “new governance” or “experimental” regulation. Third, we derive from those analyses a novel framework for choosing among prizes, patents, and grants, one in which the ultimate choice depends on a trade off between the efficacy and scalability of the institutional solution….(More)”

Nudging voters


John Hasnas and Annette Hasnas at the Hill: “A perennial complaint about our democracy is that too large a portion of the electorate is poorly informed about important political issues. This is the problem of the ignorant voter. Especially this year, with its multiplicity of candidates, keeping track of the candidates’ various, and often shifting, policy positions can be extraordinarily difficult. As a result, many of those voting in the presidential primaries will cast their ballots with little idea of where the candidates stand on several important issues.

Isn’t there some way to nudge the voters into making more informed choices? Well, actually, yes, there is. But in making this claim, we use the word nudge advisedly.

Among contemporary policy analysts, “nudge” is a term of art. It refers to creating a context within which people make choices–a “choice architecture”–that makes it more likely that people will select one option rather than another. The typical example of a nudge is a school cafeteria in which fruits and vegetables are placed in front in easy to reach locations and less healthy fare is placed in less visible and harder to reach locations. No one is forced to select the fruit or vegetables, but the choice architecture makes it more likely that people will.
The key feature of a nudge is that it is not coercive. It is an effort to influence choice, not to impose it. People are always able to “opt out” of the nudge. Thus, to nudge is to design the context in which individuals make decisions so as to influence their choice without eliminating any options.

We think that nudging can be employed to help voters make more informed decisions in the voting booth.

Imagine the following scenario. A bipartisan good government group creates a list of the most significant contemporary policy issues. It then invites all candidates to state their positions on the issues. In the current campaign, candidates could be invited to state where they stand on gay marriage, immigration, intervention in Syria, climate change, tax reform, the minimum wage, gun control, income inequality, etc. This information would be collected and fed into the relevant election commission computer. When voters enter the voting booth, they would have the option of electronically recording their policy preferences on the same form that the candidates completed. The computer would display a ranking of the candidates on the basis of how closely their positions aligned with the voter’s. After receiving this information, voters would cast their ballots.

Our proposal is a nudge. It is completely non-coercive. No candidate would be required to complete the list of his or her policy positions, although refusing to do so might be viewed negatively by voters. No voter would be required to utilize the option. All would remain free to simply walk into the booth and cast their vote. Even those who utilize the option remain free to disregard its results and vote for whomever they please. The proposal simply alters the choice architecture of voting to build in access to a source of information about the candidates. Yet, it makes it more likely that citizens will cast more informed votes than they do at present….(More)”