Paper by Kathleen Elliott Vinson and Samantha A. Moppett: “…While individuals have the constitutional right to legal assistance in criminal cases, the same does not hold true for civil matters. Low-income Americans are unable to gain access to meaningful help for basic legal needs. Although legal aid organizations exist to help low-income Americans who cannot afford legal representation, the resources available are insufficient to meet current civil legal needs. Studies show more than 80 percent of the legal needs of low-income Americans go unaddressed every year.
This article examines how law students, law schools, the legal profession, legal services’ agencies, and low-income individuals who need assistance, all have a shared interest—access to justice—and can work together to reach the elusive goal in the Pledge of Allegiance of “justice for all.” It illustrates how their collaborative leveraging of technology in innovative ways like digital pro bono services, is one way to provide access to justice. It discusses ABA Free Legal Answers Online, the program that the ABA pioneered to help confront the justice gap in the United States. The program provides a “virtual legal advice clinic” where attorneys answer civil legal questions that low-income residents post on free, secure, and confidential state-specific websites. The article provides a helpful resource of how law schools can leverage this technology to increase access to justice for low-income communities while providing pro bono opportunities for attorneys and students in their state…(More)”.
Ana Palacio at Project Syndicate: “These are difficult days for liberal democracy. But of all the threats that have arisen in recent years – populism, nationalism, illiberalism – one stands out as a key enabler of the rest: the proliferation and weaponization of disinformation.
The threat is not a new one. Governments, lobby groups, and other interests have long relied on disinformation as a tool of manipulation and control.
What is new is the ease with which disinformation can be produced and disseminated. Advances in technology allow for the increasingly seamless manipulation or fabrication of video and audio, while the pervasiveness of social media enables false information to be rapidly amplified among receptive audiences.
Beyond introducing falsehoods into public discourse, the spread of disinformation can undermine the possibility of discourse itself, by calling into question actual facts. This “truth decay” – apparent in the widespread rejection of experts and expertise – undermines the functioning of democratic systems, which depend on the electorate’s ability to make informed decisions about, say, climate policy or the prevention of communicable diseases.
The West has been slow to recognize the scale of this threat. It was only after the 2016 Brexit referendum and US presidential election that the power of disinformation to reshape politics began to attract attention. That recognition was reinforced in 2017, during the French presidential election and the illegal referendum on Catalan independence.
Now, systematic efforts to fight disinformation are underway. So far, the focus has been on tactical approaches, targeting the “supply side” of the problem: unmasking Russia-linked fake accounts, blocking disreputable sources, and adjusting algorithms to limit public exposure to false and misleading news. Europe has led the way in developing policy responses, such as soft guidelines for industry, national legislation, and strategic communications.
Such tactical actions – which can be implemented relatively easily and bring tangible results quickly – are a good start. But they are not nearly enough.
To some extent, Europe seems to recognize this. Early this month, the Atlantic Council organized #DisinfoWeek Europe, a series of strategic dialogues focused on the global challenge of disinformation. And more ambitious plans are already in the works, including French President Emmanuel Macron’s recently proposed European Agency for the Protection of Democracies, which would counter hostile manipulation campaigns.
But, as is so often the case in Europe, the gap between word and deed is vast, and it remains to be seen how all of this will be implemented and scaled up. In any case, even if such initiatives do get off the ground, they will not succeed unless they are accompanied by efforts that tackle the demand side of the problem: the factors that make liberal democratic societies today so susceptible to manipulation….(More)”.
About: “The Public Interest Technology Universities Network is a partnership that fosters collaboration between 21 universities and colleges committed to building the nascent field of public interest technology and growing a new generation of civic-minded technologists. Through the development of curricula, research agendas, and experiential learning programs in the public interest technology space, these universities are trying innovative tactics to produce graduates with multiple fluencies at the intersection of technology and policy. By joining PIT-UN, members commit to field building on campus. Members may choose to focus on some or all of these elements, in addition to other initiatives they deem relevant to establishing public interest technology on campus:
Support curriculum and faculty development to enable interdisciplinary and cross-disciplinary education of students, so they can critically assess the ethical, political, and societal implications of new technologies, and design technologies in service of the public good.
Develop experiential learning opportunities such as clinics, fellowships, apprenticeships, and internship, with public and private sector partners in the public interest technology space.
Find ways to support graduates who pursue careers working in public interest technology, recognizing that financial considerations may make careers in this area unaffordable to many.
Create mechanisms for faculty to receive recognition for the research, curriculum development, teaching, and service work needed to build public interest technology as an arena of inquiry.
Provide institutional data that will allow us to measure the effectiveness of our interventions in helping to develop the field of public interest technology….(More)”.
Paper by Löfgren, Åsa & Nordblom, Katarina: “…we develop a theoretical model to clarify the underlying mechanisms that drive individual decision making and responses to behavioral interventions, such as nudges. The contribution of the paper is three-fold: First, the model provides a theoretical framework that comprehensively structures the individual decision-making process applicable to a wide range of choice situations. Second, we reduce the confusion regarding what should be called a nudge by offering a clear classification of behavioral interventions. We distinguish among what we label as pure nudges, preference nudges, and other behavioral interventions. Third, we identify the mechanisms behind the effectiveness of behavioral interventions based on the structured decision-making process. Hence, the model can be used to predict under which circumstances, and in which choice situations, a nudge is likely to be effective….(More)”
(Open Access) Book by Roxana Radu: “… provides an incisive analysis of the emergence and evolution of global Internet governance, revealing its mechanisms, key actors and dominant community practices. Based on extensive empirical analysis covering more than four decades, it presents the evolution of Internet regulation from the early days of networking to more recent debates on algorithms and artificial intelligence, putting into perspective its politically-mediated system of rules built on technical features and power differentials.
For anyone interested in understanding contemporary global developments, this book is a primer on how norms of behaviour online and Internet regulation are renegotiated in numerous fora by a variety of actors – including governments, businesses, international organisations, civil society, technical and academic experts – and what that means for everyday users….(More)”.
Gideon Rachman at the Financial Times: “The 19th-century popularised the idea of the “nation state”. The 21st could be the century of the “civilisation state”. A civilisation state is a country that claims to represent not just a historic territory or a particular language or ethnic-group, but a distinctive civilisation.
It is an idea that is gaining ground in states as diverse as China, India, Russia, Turkey and, even, the US. The notion of the civilisation state has distinctly illiberal implications. It implies that attempts to define universal human rights or common democratic standards are wrong-headed, since each civilisation needs political institutions that reflect its own unique culture. The idea of a civilisation state is also exclusive. Minority groups and migrants may never fit in because they are not part of the core civilisation.
One reason that the idea of the civilisation state is likely to gain wider currency is the rise of China. In speeches to foreign audiences, President Xi Jinping likes to stress the unique history and civilisation of China. This idea has been promoted by pro-government intellectuals, such as Zhang Weiwei of Fudan university. In an influential book, The China Wave: Rise of a Civilisational State, Mr Zhang argues that modern China has succeeded because it has turned its back on western political ideas — and instead pursued a model rooted in its own Confucian culture and exam-based meritocratic traditions. Mr Zhang was adapting an idea first elaborated by Martin Jacques, a western writer, in a bestselling book, When China Rules The World. “China’s history of being a nation state”, Mr Jacques argues, “dates back only 120-150 years: its civilisational history dates back thousands of years.” He believes that the distinct character of Chinese civilisation leads to social and political norms that are very different from those prevalent in the west, including “the idea that the state should be based on familial relations [and] a very different view of the relationship between the individual and society, with the latter regarded as much more important”. …
Civilisational views of the state are also gaining ground in Russia. Some of the ideologues around Vladimir Putin now embrace the idea that Russia represents a distinct Eurasian civilisation, which should never have sought to integrate with the west. In a recent article Vladislav Surkov, a close adviser to the Russian president, argued that his country’s “repeated fruitless efforts to become a part of western civilisation are finally over”. Instead, Russia should embrace its identity as “a civilisation that has absorbed both east and west” with a “hybrid mentality, intercontinental territory and bipolar history. It is charismatic, talented, beautiful and lonely. Just as a half-breed should be.” In a global system moulded by the west, it is unsurprising that some intellectuals in countries such as China, India or Russia should want to stress the distinctiveness of their own civilisations.
What is more surprising is that rightwing thinkers in the US are also retreating from the idea of “universal values” — in favour of emphasising the unique and allegedly endangered nature of western civilisation….(More)”.
Introduction by Julian Corner to Special Issue of Alliance: “This special feature explores a growing aspiration in philanthropy to achieve system-level change. It looks at the potential and pitfalls by profiling a number of approaches adopted by different foundations….
While the fortunes of systems thinking have ebbed and flowed over the decades, it has mainly occurred on the margins of organisations. This time something different seems to be happening, at least in terms of philanthropy. A number of major foundations are embracing systems approaches as a core methodology. How should we understand this?…
I detect at least four broad approaches or attitudes to systems in foundations’ work, all of which have been at play in Lankelly Chase’s work at different points:
1.The system as a unit of intervention Many foundations are trying to take in a broader canvas, recognising that both problems and solutions are generated by the interplay of multiple variables. They hope to find leverage points among these variables, so that their investment can unlock so-called system-level change. Some of their strategies include: working for policy changes, scaling disruptive innovations, supporting advocacy for people’s rights, and improving the evidence base used by system actors. These approaches seem to work best when there is common agreement on an identifiable system, such as the criminal justice system, which can be mapped and acted on.
2.Messy contested systems Some foundations find they are drawn deeper into complexity. They unearth conflicting perspectives on the nature of the problem, especially when there is a power inequality between those defining it and those experiencing it. As greater interconnection emerges, the frame put around the canvas is shown to be arbitrary and the hope of identifying leverage points begins to look reductive. One person’s solution turns out to be another’s problem. Unable to predict how change might occur, foundations shift towards more exploratory and inquiring approaches. Rather than funding programmes or institutions, they seek to influence the conditions of change, focusing on collaborations, place-based approaches, collective impact, amplifying lesser heard voices, building skills and capacities, and reframing the narratives people hold.
3.Seeing yourself in the system As appreciation of interconnection deepens, the way foundations earn money, how they make decisions, the people they choose to include in (and exclude from) their work, how they specify success, all come into play as parts of the system that need to change. These foundations realise that they aren’t just looking at a canvas, they are part of it. At Lankelly Chase, we now view our position as fundamentally paradoxical, given that we are seeking to tackle inequality by holding accumulated wealth. We have sought to model the behaviours of healthier systems, including delegated decision-making, mutual accountability, trust-based relationships, promoting equality of voice. By aiming for congruence between means and ends, we and our peers contend that effective practice and ethical practice become the same.
4.Beyond systems There comes a point when the idea of systems itself can feel reductive. Different values are invoked, those of kindness and solidarity. The basis on which humans relate to each other becomes the core concern. Inspiration is sought in other histories and forms of spiritualty, as suppressed narratives are surfaced. The frame of philanthropy itself is no longer a given, with mutuality and even reparation becoming the basis of an alternative paradigm.
….Foundations can be viewed as both ‘of’ and ‘outside’ any system. This is a tension that isn’t resolvable, but if handled with sufficient self-awareness could make foundations powerful systems practitioners….(More)”.
Blog Post by Emilie Scott: “…Lilian Edwards, a U.K.-based academic in internet law, points out that public spaces like smart cities further dilutes the level of consent in the IoT: “While consumers may at least have theoretically had a chance to read the privacy policy of their Nest thermostat before signing the contract, they will have no such opportunity in any real sense when their data is collected by the smart road or smart tram they go to work on, or as they pass the smart dustbin.”
If citizens have expectations that their interactions in smart cities will resemble the technological interactions they have become familiar with, they will likely be sadly misinformed about the level of control they will have over what personal information they end up sharing.
The typical citizen understands that “choosing convenience” when you engage with technology can correspond to a decrease in their level of personal privacy. On at least some level, this is intended to be a choice. Most users may not choose to carefully read a privacy policy on a smartphone application or a website; however, if that policy is well-written and compliant, the user can exercise a right to decide whether they consent to the terms and wish to engage with the company.
The right to choose what personal information you exchange for services is lost in the smart city.
Theoretically, the smart city can bypass this right because municipal government services are subject to provincial public-sector privacy legislation, which can ultimately entail informing citizens their personal information is being collected by way of a notice.
However, the assumption that smart city projects are solely controlled by the public sector is questionable and verges on problematic. Most smart-city projects in Canada are run via public-private partnerships as municipal governments lack both the budget and the expertise to implement the technology system. Private companies can have leading roles in designing, building, financing, operating and maintaining smart-city projects. In the process, they can also have a large degree of control over the data that is created and used.
In some countries, these partnerships can even result in an unprecedented level of privatization. For example, Cisco Systems debatably has a larger claim over Songdo’s development than the South Korean government. Smart-city public-private partnership can have complex implications for data control even when both partners are highly engaged. Trapeze, a private-sector company in transportation software, cautions the public sector on the unintended transfer of data control when electing private providers to operate data systems in a partnership….
When the typical citizen enters a smart city, they will not know 1.) what personal information is being collected, nor will they know 2.) who is collecting it. The former is an established requirement of informed consent, and the later has debatably never been an issue until the development of smart cities.
While similar privacy issues are playing out in smart cities all around the world, Canada must take steps to determine how its own specific privacy legal structure is going to play a role in responding to these privacy issues in our own emerging smart-city projects….(More)”.
Alex Ingrams in the Review of Policy Research: “Big data applications have been acclaimed as potentially transformative for the public sector. But, despite this acclaim, most theory of big data is narrowly focused around technocratic goals. The conceptual frameworks that situate big data within democratic governance systems recognizing the role of citizens are still missing. This paper explores the democratic governance impacts of big data in three policy areas using Robert Dahl’s dimensions of control and autonomy. Key impacts and potential tensions are highlighted. There is evidence of impacts on both dimensions, but the dimensions conflict as well as align in notable ways and focused policy efforts will be needed to find a balance….(More)”.
Paper by Ayinde Lateef, Funmilola Olubunmi Omotayo: “This article considers information as a strategic asset in the organization just as land, labourand capital. It elaborates how information assets help organizations to meet its organizational objectives and also examine issues that led to the proliferation of information assets; because of the proliferation of data and information, it becomes difficult for organization to make effective use of these information assets to meets its objectives. This leads to management of information assets and management of information risk. These two areas are critical to organization. It was concluded that information audit is the effective tool that could be used to manage the information asset and information risk. Also that information policy should be drawn; information professional should be among those handling information-related issues….(More)”.
